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Abstract 
A one-shot provision point mechanism with money-back guarantee and proportional rebate ofexcess 
contributions is tested in an induced value framework and in experimental environments chosen to 
mimic field conditions. The results show that this relatively simple mechanism is empirically 
demand revealing in the aggregate when used with large groups of students who have heterogenous 
valuations for the public good. Approximately demand revealing behavior was obtained under three 
alternative information conditions. These results are an important step in the design ofa mechanism 
simple enough to allow field applications, but capable ofefficiently providing public goods through 
voluntary contributions. 
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Voluntary Revelation of the Demand for Public Goods 
Using a Provision Point Mechanism 
1. Introduction 
Benevolent organizations, clubs, associations and at times even governments and industry 
rely on citizen action and voluntary monetary contributions to provide a wide variety of public 
goods. Unfortunately, standard theoretical models ofvoluntary public goods provision make strong 
predictions of under-contribution by individuals. Although individuals do contribute voluntarily 
toward the provision of public goods, the evidence provided by two decades of experimental 
research clearly supports the prediction of under-contribution [Ledyard (1995), Davis and Holt 
(1993)]. Relying on funding mechanisms that inaccurately reflect contributors' preferences suggests 
that socially desirable public goods are produced at sub-optimal levels and underscores the need for 
a contribution mechanism capable of revealing the demand for public goods in natural conditions. 
Such a mechanism has thus far eluded researchers. Some public goods mechanisms such as 
the Groves-Ledyard [Groves and Ledyard, (1977)] and Smith Auction [Smith, (1979 and 1980); 
Coursey and Smith, (1984); and Harstad and Marrese, (1982)] have been shown to induce optimal 
production of public goods in laboratory settings after a number of rounds of repeated play. 
Unfortunately, these are far too complex and impractical for implementation in field conditions 
where pragmatism dictates the use of a simply understood one-shot mechanism [Davis and Holt, 
(1993); Alston and Nowell (1996)]. An alternative mechanism, the Voluntary Contributions 
Mechanism (VCM) has the simplicity required for field applications but consistently produces 
contribution levels 40 to 60% below the optimum!. 
In this paper, we report the results ofa series oflaboratory experiments in which we explore 
1 See Ledyard (1995) for a thorough survey of experimental research on the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism. 
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the perfonnance ofa one-shot provision point mechanism (pPM) with money back guarantee (MBG) 
and a proportional rebate of excess contributions (PR) applied in experimental conditions that 
attempt to replicate field circumstances. These include the use of large groups of non-economics 
students and incomplete infonnation. 
With this mechanism, a public good ofpre-detennined size is provided only if the sum of 
contributions equals or exceeds its cost (the provision point). Ifcontributions fall short ofcosts, they 
are completely refunded (the money back guarantee) whereas if they exceed costs, the excess is 
returned to each contributor proportionally to the share of their individual contribution in the total 
amount contributed (the proportional rebate). As we indicate in the next section, the PPM has been 
shown to increase contributions but has fallen short of inducing demand revelation. Yet, because of 
the design of previous experiments, little can be said with certainty about the perfonnance of this 
mechanism in environments resembling plausible field conditions where a single shot is required 
and a potentially large number of individuals with heterogenous values can benefit from the 
provision of a public good. 
The central objective of our research is therefore to test the perfonnance of the PPM with a 
MBG and a PR in experimental environments that mimic key features and constraints encountered 
in the field. The provision point framework enables us to induce well defmed individual values for 
a discrete public good, thus providing a basis to measure how variations in the environment affect 
contributions. In particular, we investigate the impact ofgroup size and incomplete infonnation on 
the proportion of induced value revealed by subjects. Group size has been shown to have a positive 
-
effects on contributions with other public goods mechanisms [Isaac et al. (1994), Rose et al. (1997)] 
while limited evidence exists on the effect of incomplete infonnation- in PPM experiments [Marks 
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and Croson (forthcoming)]. Our results show that, regardless ofthe information condition in which 
the mechanism is tested, large groups ofnon-business students given heterogenous values provide 
an aggregate amount of contributions approximately equal to their induced demand for the public 
good. 
After a brief review of past fmdings, we present two sets of experiments in which we 
examine in turn the effects ofgroup size and variations in information conditions on the proportion 
of induced demand revealed by participants. Concluding remarks follow. 
2. The Provision Point Mechanism 
In a typical provision point experiment, participants are part of a group of N individuals 
taking part in a number of decision rounds. At the beginning of a round, each person in the group 
is given an initial balance of money (denoted by the letter I) and must decide how much of this 
money to keep and how much to allocate to a group fund (B j , where the subscript indexes the 
individual's contribution). Ifthe mechanism includes a MBG (first tested in similar experiments by 
Isaac et al. 1989) and the sum ofcontributions is below the provision point (PP), contributions are 
fully refunded and individual earnings are equal to the initial balance. Alternatively, ifthe group sum 
of bids equals or exceeds the PP, the group fund yields a return and individual's earnings for the 
round are the sum of the initial balance minus her contribution, plus a personal return from the 
investment fund (the induced value, V), plus a payment according to the rebate rule implemented. 
The proportional rebate rule used in this paper was first proposed by Smith (1980) as part of the 
Smith public good auction and was recently studied by Marks and Croson (1998) in a PPM setting. 
­
Under this rule, contributions in excess of the PP are returned to individuals in proportion to the 
share of their personal contribution relative to the total received. For example, someone whose 
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contribution amounts to 5% of total donations would receive a rebate equal to 5% of the amount of 
contributions in excess of the PP. Hence, individual i's earnings (Ei) are given algebraically by 
E, = 
!-B,+Vj + ~I (_pp+"N_ B;) if" N B;. ~ pp
"B LJ;-J LJ ;=J 
LJ;=J ; 
In this context, a socially desirable public good is created by the experimenter ifthe sum ofinduced 
values is greater than the provision point. This public good is efficiently provided if subjects make 
aggregate contributions that equal or exceed the provision point. Therefore, aggregate demand 
revelation, ifit can be achieved obtained, would guarantee that all desirable public goods will always 
be provided and that the mechanism is perfectly efficient regardless of the PP and whether or not it 
is know by subjects. 
Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker (1989), Suleiman and Rapoport (1992) and Dawes et al. (1986) 
report that simply·creating a threshold cost of provision had a significant positive impact on 
contributions compared to similar VCM treatments. This result is testimony to the power of a 
provision point since, in the absence ofa MBG, failure to reach the provision threshold results in a 
loss of contributions by individuals. A MBG would therefore seem to be a desirable form of 
insurance against such losses. Significant increases in contributions have been reported by Isaac et 
al. (1989) in experiments where subjects were free to contribute any amount toward the provision 
ofthe public good and by Rapoport and Eshed-Levy (1989) in experiments where participants could 
-
contribute a fixed amount or noting at all. In contrast, Dawes et al. (1986) found no improvements 
in contribution rates after adding a MBG in a similar binary decision"environment. 
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Adding a rebate rule is another form of insurance guaranteeing that contributions in excess 
of the PP will not be lost by the group. Marks and Croson (1998) investigated the effects of 
alternative rebate rules in PPM experiments with MBG. They report that implementing the PR rule 
or using excess contributions to increase the scope ofthe public good both improved contributions. 
Here, we chose to implement the PR rule because it has a positive effect on contributions and, 
compared to the increased scope rule, it fixes the cost and benefits of the public good, providing 
experimental control over the subjects' values. 
The full information game theoretic predictions for the PPM with MBG was derived by 
Bagnoli and Lipman (1989) and is further discussed by Marks and Croson (1998) for the case where 
a PR rule is added to the mechanism. In this game, any combination of individually rational 
contributions summing exactly to the provision point is an efficient Nash outcome2. It should be 
clear that when the benefit-cost ratio of the public good is greater than one, aggregate demand 
revelation is not a Nash equilibrium since any individual who contributed a positive amount would 
choose to unilaterally reduce the amount of such contribution given the chance (as long as the PP 
is still met). Hence, the PPM is not theoretically incentive compatible. Whether or not it is demand 
revealing becomes is therefore a purely empirical question. 
Bagnoli and McKee (1989) conducted full information provision point experiments with 
MBG using small groups of subjects who were given unequal values for the threshold public good. 
2 Assuming that players are only motivated by their own gains, a contribution is individually rational if it 
does not exceed the players' value for the public good. This game also has a large set of inefficient equilibria. An ­
inefficient equilibria is any vector of individual contributions where 
I) '" N Bj < PP; and 2) (pp _'" N Bj ) > (v, - B;) ';/ i . That is, the sum of contributions is below the provision point ~Jcl ~J=I 
and no individual can unilaterally increase his or her contribution to make the group reach the provision point while 
maintaining individual rationality. 
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These subjects contributed on average 78.7% of their value in the first round of the game. In a 
simpler design, Cadsby and Maynes (fortcoming and 1998) used a PPM without MBG or rebate and 
gave equal endowments and valuations to all subjects. In the first round of separate experiments, 
economics and business students contributed 60.6% of their true demand, nurses revealed 85%, 
groups of male-only students contributed 40.2% and female-only students contributed 56%. 
Finally, in a study of alternative rebate rules, Marks and Croson (1998) obtained aggregate 
contributions averaging 63.7% of induced value in the first rounds of treatments with a MBG and 
PR.) 
With contribution levels ranging from 40 to 85% of induced demand, variants of the PPM 
yield some improvements over the 40 to 60% of optimal contributions usually obtained with the 
VCM but it leaves a substantial gap for desirable projects to go unfunded. However, the laboratory 
environments constructed for earlier tests ofthe PPM differ from plausible field conditions in many 
respects. Hence, we seek to analyze the performance ofthe PPM with MBG and PR in experimental 
environments that more closely resemble field conditions. 
The key environmental conditions that set our experiments apart from previous research are 
related to group size, repetition of play, subject pool used, distribution of benefits from the public 
good, and information available to participants. Whereas previous research was conducted with 
) Rapoport and Suleiman (1993), Asch, Gigliotti and Polito (1993), Marks and Croson (forthcoming) and 
Croson and Marks (1996) have also conducted interesting provision point experiments. Unfortunately, individuals 
in these studies were given initial balances lower than their value for the public good. Hence, they faced an income 
constraint that did not allow them to reveal their true demand and precludes an unbiased analysis of demand 
revelation in these experiments. Similarly, Isaac, Schmidtz and Walker (1989) added a provision point and a money 
back guarantee to the VCM environment ofIsaac, Walker and Thomas (1984). The mechanism used an extended 
benefit rule whereby contributions beyond the provision point increase the scope of, and hence the benefits from the 
public good. Additional benefits beyond the provision point eliminates the well defined demand against which to 
assess demand revelation performance. 
-
.. 
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small groups of 5 to 12 subjects, we test the performance of the mechanism in groups of up to 50 
subjects. In an equally important departure from prior research, we limit our experiments (with the 
exception of a control group) to a single round of decision making. This approach removes any 
possibility ofstrategic behavior that may exist in early rounds ofrepeated games. In the experiments 
reported in this paper, we assign subjects to one of several payoff conditions. Such heterogenous 
values are a characteristic offield conditions that allows us to induce a controlled, downward sloping 
demand curve for the public good. Of all experiments previously conducted, only Bagnoli and 
McKee's design combined heterogenous values with a sufficient money endowment for subjects to 
reveal their demand for the public good. Finally, for our second set of experiments, we recruited 
subjects with a more diverse background than the economics and business students traditionally used 
in experimental economics. This sets aside questions regarding the possible effects of economics 
training on behavior in these treatments. Ofthe research cited earlier, only Cadsby and Maynes have 
systematically chosen non-economics students in their treatment with nurses. 
The resulting combination ofenvironmental features differs substantially from any laboratory 
setting previously assembled for studying the PPM. This basic environment will be modified to test 
the effects of group size and incomplete information on contribution levels. 
3. The Effect of Group-Size on Contributions 
Isaac, Walker and Williams (1994) found that individuals in groups of40 and 100 individuals 
contributed a significantly larger proportion of their endowment to a VCM public good than did 
subjects in groups of4 and 10. The only other large group (n=100) experiment we are aware ofwas 
conducted as part of our own research program but in a different context. In Rose et al. (1997), we 
report that a PPM with MBG where subjects could only contribute a fixed amount (or not at all) 
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produced aggregate results consistent with demand revelation: on average, individuals with values 
higher than the fixed amount contributed while those with values lower did not. However, because 
of the constrained contribution level, questions remain as to whether group size effects carry over 
to the PPM with continuous contributions, MBG and PRo We address this question first by 
comparing contribution levels in groups of six and fifty students. 
Design. Four "pen and paper" experiments were conducted with lower division Cornell University 
students. The first three ofthese were small group control experiments while the fourth was carried 
out with a large number of subjects. For each ofthe small group experiments, six volunteer students 
who had never participated in economics experiments were recruited from an introductory 
economics class. It was emphasized in recruiting students that no knowledge of economics was 
required to participate. 
At the beginning ofthe session, subjects read instructions describing the experiment and their 
task but were not given complete information about the parameters ofthe game.4 They knew the size 
ofthe group and that all participants had an equal endowment of500 experimental cents. They also 
knew their potential private payoff from the public good. However, they were told that this payoff 
had been randomly selected without being given any information about the distribution of values. 
They were only informed that other subjects may not have the same payoff. This feature mimics 
field conditions where individuals value public goods differently but are generally unaware ofother 
people's values [Alston and Nowell (1996)]. 
The level of the provision point was not disclosed either. It was only announced that it had 
-

been randomly drawn from an unspecified distribution. Withholding information about the PP 
4 Instructions are available from the authors. 
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prevents subjects from making their contribution decision based on an "equal cost share" strategy 
(e.g. dividing the cost of the project equally among participants)5 and may help raise contributions. 
Finally, participants in the small group experiments knew that the game would be repeated, but were 
not told how many times. For the purpose of this paper, however, we will only be interested in 
results from the first period since it is most comparable to the single shot large group experiment that 
Individual payoffs from the group fimd, ifthe provision point was met or exceeded, were the 
randomly drawn numbers $2.12, $2.42, $3.69, $3.72, $3.76 and $3.90 experimental dollars, for total 
benefits (aggregate induced demand) from the public good of$19.63. The randomly drawn provision 
point was $7.53, creating a benefit-cost ratio of2.6. Experimental earnings were exchanged at the 
rate of one dollar = $0.25 (US). 
The large group experiment was conducted with fifty students from a different undergraduate 
economics class. Rather than recruiting on a voluntary basis, all students in the class participated 
5 Share calculations are rarely possible in the field, except for club goods. The information condition 
where the group size is known but the PP is unknown has real life parallels. An example comes from the Niagara 
Mohawk Power Company which recently offered its 1.2 million residential customers a green choice program in 
which the final cost of the project was to be determined through competitive bidding [Rose et al. (1997)]. 
6 As in the one-shot application, subjects in the first period of a repeated game have no experience with 
the mechanism. However, repeated play may encourage signaling in early rounds,.thereby increasing contributions 
in this treatment. If this were the case, the direction of the bias would make it more difficult to demonstrate that 
group size positively affects contribution levels. This approach is therefore conservative. 
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in the experiment7• This experiment was limited to a single period ofplay. The one-shot game better 
conforms to field conditions and allowed us to increase individual stakes fourfold by adjusting the 
exchange rate to one experimental dollar = $1 (US) (behavior should not be affected by such a 
monotonic transformation). The PP was scaled up to $62.75, an increase proportional to the change 
in the number ofstudents in the group but this change cannot affect the results since the PP remained 
unknown to subjects. The experiment was otherwise identical to the small group control 
experiments. The same six randomly drawn induced values were used and the information position 
of subjects was unchanged. 
Results. We use several indicators to report the performance ofthe mechanism. However, we are 
particularly interested in the mean and median ofB; IV; , the proportion of individual induced value 
contributed to the group fund. We will also pay a special attention to the ratio ofaggregate demand 
revealed to aggregate demand induced Ci.B; II. V;). 
Pooling the data from the three small group experiments we fmd that individuals contributed 
on average 64% of their induced value, with a median of 71.8%. The ratio of aggregate revealed 
demand to total induced demand is 66.7%. This ratio falls within the range of40.2% to 85% reported 
in previous research. Thus, we feel comfortable that our design and instructions are comparable to 
earlier PPM experiments and provide an adequate basis of comparison for the results of the large 
group treatment. A summary of the results is presented in Table 1. 
7 All large group experiments reported in this paper have been conducted with entire classes of students. 
Conducting experiments with entire classes avoids the risk of self-selection bias inherent to the recruitment of 
volunteers. The experiments were conducted at the beginning of a regular class by a guest lecturer and his research 
-
assistants, none of whom had prior contacts with the students or would be involved in the student's grading. 
Participation was not mandatory and it was emphasized that the experiment was perfonned for research purposes 
only (although aggregate results would be reported at the end of the class) and that individual answers and earnings 
would remain strictly confidential. Finally, the regular instructor was not involved" in conducting the experiment. 
We believe that these procedures reduce the possibility that expectational effects bias the data. 
II 
Table 1 
Summary data 
Small and Large Group Comparison 
Experiment ID Small Groups 
(pooled Data) 
Large Group 
Number of Subjects (N) 18 50 
Mean Vj (cents) 327 325.8 
Mean Contribution (cents) 
(SD) 
218.1 * 
(128.2) 
349.0 
(135.5) 
Median Contribution (cents) 200 380 
Mean BjNj 
(SD) 
64.4% ** 
(32.1%) 
110.0% *** 
(48.5%) 
Median BiN; 71.8% 104.0% *** 
% of Demand Revealed 66.7% 107.1% 
* different from 300 at the 5% significance level
 
** different from 100% at the 5% significance level
 
*** different from the small group result at the 5% significance level
 
In contrast, participants in the large group experiment approximately revealed their demand 
for the public good. The mean and median proportion of value contributed by individuals to the 
group fimd were respectively 110% and 104%. The mean of 110% is not statistically different from 
100% at the 5% significance level (t=1.459). On the other hand, we reject the hypothesis that the 
mean from the large group is equal to the mean of 64% of value obtained in the small group 
-
12 
experiments (t=3.788)8. Parallel tests on the medians confirm theses results.9 The medians of the 
small and large group experiments are significantly different from one another at the 5% significance 
level (Mann-Whitney z=3.753). A 95% confidence interval around the large group's median is 
bounded by 100.00% and 117.92%, clearly containing the value of 100% we would expect for a 
perfectly demand revealing mechanism. Hence, all tests support the conclusion that contribution 
levels in the large group experiment are different from those obtained from small groups, but not 
different from aggregate demand revelation. In the aggregate, the ratio of revealed to induced 
demand in the large group is 107%, a close approximation to demand revealing behavior. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the results. In these figures, the bars represent individual induced 
values and are graphed in descending order to form the induced demand for the public good. 
Individual contributions are also ordered from high to low and plotted as a line to represent the 
revealed demand curve. These graphs vividly illustrate the upward shift in the revealed demand 
curve obtained in the large group experiment. The overbidding and capping of contributions in the 
large group experiment is also visible in the upper left hand comer of Figure 2. These large bids 
roughly compensate for the cheap riding observable at the other end of the curve where induced 
demand is above revealed demand. 
8 The difference is significant at the 5% confidence level. The degrees of freedom for this test were 
adjusted to 47 to account for the statistical inequality of variances in the small and large group data. 
9 Tests on means are biased by the fact that roughly a quarter of all individual contributions in the large ­
group experiment appear to have been constrained by the initial endowment of$5. This truncates the distribution of 
contributions, restraining both the mean and variance of the individual bid to value ratios. However, since the 
direction of the bias is to lower the difference between the means ofthe two experiments, we maintain that the 
difference would still hold in the absence of the endowment constraint. Tests on medians are not affected by the 
truncation of contributions. 
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Figure 2 
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While we attribute the increase in contributions primarily to group size, we must note that 
other design features did not remain constant between treatments and may be responsible for the 
observed differences. Subjects were from different classes, participants in the small group 
experiments were volunteers whereas the large group treatment was conducted with an entire class 
and the results reported for small groups are the donations in the first round of a repeated game as 
-
opposed to a single application ofthe mechanism. Notwithstanding these caveats, the data from these 
experiments demonstrate that it is possible to induce large groups to voluntary reveal their aggregate 
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demand for public goods with a relatively simple mechanism. Next, we set out to replicate these 
results and test the effect of alternative information structures on subject behavior. 
4. The Role of Incomplete Information in the Provision Point Mechanism 
The objectives pursued with this set of experiments are 1) to replicate with non-economics 
students the results obtained in our first large group experiment and 2) to test whether alternative 
information conditions affect contribution levels. Specifically, we follow Bagnoli and Lipman and 
conjecture that when the number of subjects and the value of the PP are both known, subjects may 
show a greater tendency to choose a contribution level representing equal cost shares (pPIN, the 
symmetric Nash equilibrium). In a test of this conjecture, Bagnoli and McKee (1991) found 
empirical evidence ofcost-sharing in full information experiments. Withholding information about 
the value of PP or N removes this focal point and may encourage demand revelation by forcing 
individuals to formulate a contribution strategymore strongly based on their private incentives rather 
than on the availability of a simple rule of thumb. This reasoning is similar to Bohm's (1972) 
argument that uncertainty about the cost of a public program puts "voters" in a situation in which 
incentives to using simple strategies leading to bias are absent. 10 Thus, we seek to explore the effect 
on contributions ofremoving information about the number ofsubjects and the level ofthe provision 
point. 
Design. Three experiments were conducted with groups of45 students enrolled in an introductory 
natural resources course. Approximately 5% ofthose students had previously taken an economics 
10 Marks and Croson (forthcoming) found that withholding infonnation about other subject's values for the 
public good to prevent subjects from calculating the proportional cost-share (PP * viI f.j) had no significant 
effect on the tendency of groups to adopt Nash behavior. This design still allowed subjects to calculate the equal 
cost share (PPIN) which is of interest to Bagnoli and Lipman, Bagnoli and McKee and to us. 
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class. Subjects were endowed with an initial balance of600 cents and randomly assigned to one of 
five induced values ranging from $1.50 to $4.50, in increments of $0.75. The only difference 
between treatments was the information participants received about the number of subjects in their 
group and the level of the provision point. Subjects in group A were informed that 45 students in 
their group faced an investment cost of$45. Subjects in group B only knew the number of students 
in the group, and members ofgroup C were only informed about the value ofthe provision point. I I 
Therefore, this experiment not only tests the focal point hypothesis but also evaluates the 
performance of the PPM in alternative situations relevant to field applications. 
Our original instructions were edited to accommodate these changes. Subjects in incomplete 
information treatments were told that the number withheld from them was "predetermined but 
unknown to you". Since the group size was unknown in one group, all instructions contained two 
examples ofthe proportional rebate rule. These examples used groups ofsize 2 and 200 respectively. 
Subjects were told that these were the minimum and maximum possible number of students in a 
group since the enrollment for the class was 200. 12 With n=45 and PP=$45, the focal point of $1 
is easily computed by subjects in group A and was deliberately set low enough to make the cost 
sharing strategy rational for all subjects (all induced values were above $1). 
II Each of these information conditions corresponds to a plausible public good situation. Group A 
corresponds to the funding of a club good with known cost. An example of such a situation occurred when the 
nordic ski club in Boulder CO raised money to maintain a bankrupt ski area for the winter. Members of group B 
represent a community of known size raising money for a project subject to cost uncertainty akin to the Niagara 
Mohawk Power Company program alluded to in Footnote 3. The information condition faced by members of group 
C are similar to many public allocation problems. A land trust soliciting donations from the public for the purchase 
and conservation of a tract ofland falls in this category. 
12 Actual attendance for the class was 149. The 14 students who could not be accommodated in groups A, 
B, or C were put in a group D where both PP and N were unknown so that everyone in the classroom could 
participate in an experiment. We do not report the data from Group D since most students in this group were not 
present for opening remarks announcing the experiment and the general procedures that would be followed. 
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Results. Table 2 summarizes the descriptive statistics for each treatment. The first notable result is 
that there is no significant difference in behavior across alternative information conditions. The 
average proportion of individual value revealed by subjects ranges from 103% for group B to 132% 
for group C. Group A, which had the information to calculate equal cost shares falls between the two 
with an average of110% ofindividual value revealed. Pair-wisemeans tests cannot detect significant 
differences between these values [tAvsB = 0.381; tAvsC = -0.970; tBvsC = -1.392 (unequal variances)], 
and rank-sum tests comparing the median bid to value ratios of 86%, 93% and 100% also fail to 
indicate differences between the three treatments (ZAvsB = 0.073; ZAvsC = 0.892; ZBvsC =1.00). 
The number of$1 bids for groups A, B and C is respectively 7, 3 and 4. Hence, bids at the 
focal point are more frequent in group A. However, in tests ofproportionality comparing group A 
to Band C, we cannot reject the null that the frequencies are equal (PAvsB = 0.180; PAvsC = 0.334). 
Based on this evidence, we conclude that the availability ofinformation on N and PP did not create 
meaningful incentives to adopt a simple cost sharing strategy. 
The most important fmding of this paper is that, in large group situations, the ability ofthe 
provision point mechanism with MBG and PR to reveal aggregate demand appears robust to changes 
in experimental parameters, subject type and information provided to participants. The individual 
contribution to value ratios of 103%, 110% and 132% found for groups A, B and C are not different 
from 100% at the 5% significance level. Similarly, the medians, at 86%, 93% and 100% ofinduced 
value each generates a 95% confidence interval that includes 100%. We also note that the mean bids 
of $2.89 (t=0.332), $2.86 (t=0.494) and $3.38 (t=1.208) do not statistically differ from the mean 
induced value of$3.00. Finally, 95% confidence intervals around each ofthe median contributions 
of $2.50, $3.00 and $3.50 include the value of $3 consistent with a mechanism that, overall, 
produces demand revelation. 
18 
Table 2 
Summary Data 
A fi ond'fComparIson cross I normafIOn C I IOns 
Experiment ill A B C 
Information Provided (N) yes; (PP) yes (N) yes; (PP) no (N) no; (PP) yes 
Number of Subjects (N) 45 45 45 
Mean Vi (cents) 300 300 300 
Mean Contribution (cents) 
(SD) 
288.9 
(221.2) 
285.6 
(190.3) 
337.7 
(210.8) 
Median Contribution (cents) 250 300 350 
Mean BjNj 
(SD) 
110.5% 
(99.2%) 
103.2% 
(83.5%) 
132.2% 
(112.0%) 
Median BjNj 86.1.% 93.3% 100.0% 
% of Demand Revealed 96.3% 95.2% 112.6% 
The total demand revealed by the three groups are 96%, 95% and 112% of total induced 
value. These ratios are comparable to the ratio of 107% found in our first large group experiment. 
Hence, our initial large group results were replicated in a total of three different information 
conditions, with a modified vector of induced values, and using non-business students. Figure 3 
illustrates the results. As we previously reported, overbidding by some subjects essentially offsets 
the cheap-riding ofothers in all treatments. While the slopes ofthe revealed demand curves are poor 
indicators oftrue demand, the means and medians are accurate and can be used to infer the aggregate 
benefits ofthe public good. Since a number ofsubjects still appear to have been constrained by their 
-
endowment, median statistics should be given more weight than means. 
. . 
- -
- -
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Figure 3 
Induced and Revealed Demand 
Effects of Information Experiments 
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5. Conclusion 
Using large groups in an induced value framework, we have shown that the provision point 
mechanism with money-back guarantee and proportional rebate ofexcess contributions can closely 
approximate demand revelation. The mean and median statistics for both, the absolute individual 
contributions and the proportion of induced value revealed were all statistically consistent with 
demand revealing behavior. To our knowledge, it is the first time that a simple one-shot public goods 
mechanism that allows a wide range of donation levels has elicited voluntary contributions 
approximately equal to the true value of a public good. 
Overall, the cheap-riding of some subjects was compensated 'by the over-contributions of 
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others in all four large group experiments presented in this paper. The fact that some subjects 
contributed amounts above their induced value appears to be irrational and suggests that additional 
research designed to test individual motives is required. It is possible that subjects have altruistic 
motives that cannot be directly controlled for in the laboratory. Some individuals may also 
erroneously interpret the MBG and PR as providing an insurance that earnings cannot be less than 
their initial endowment or that by contributing a large amount, it is possible to capture a larger part 
of contributions in excess of the PP. Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) have recently suggested that, 
indeed, high contribution levels in early rounds ofpublic goods (VCM) experiments can in part be 
explained by subject errors, but they also present evidence of the existence of a positive "warm 
glow" associated with the simple act of contributing toward the provision of a public good. 
The provision point mechanism with money-back guarantee and proportional rebate is simple 
enough to provide hope that similar results can be replicated under field conditions. Yet, the failure 
ofthe same mechanism to reveal demand in prior research and in our own small group trials suggest 
that the key to fully understand the PPM resides not so much in the mechanism itself as in the 
environment in which it is applied. Some of the fmdings of this research point to group size as a 
determinant factor affecting contributions. Nevertheless, several additional experiments will be 
required before we can adequately understand how group size and other factors such as subject 
background, recruitment or self-selection, altruism or warm-glow affect the performance ofthe PPM, 
and assess its capacity to efficiently provide public goods in real world situations. 
-
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